A Nairobi hotel borrowed $22m from two development banks, ten months after it was bought

The problem: a hotel that needed a long loan

In 2020 the Crowne Plaza in Nairobi's Upper Hill district retrenched 144 employees and put 46 more on unpaid leave. IFC's environmental review gives the cause as COVID-19 restrictions and financial constraints.⁶ By June 2022 the hotel had 38 employees.^4,6

Its owners had planned to sell at the start of 2020. Ecofin, citing Business Daily, reported that the sale was delayed, notably by COVID-19.¹¹

A buyer of a hotel in that state needs two things from a lender. One is a long loan. The other is a grace period before repayments begin, long enough for the rooms to fill again. IFC wrote that what Kasada needed was "a long-term loan with adequate grace period to accommodate protracted recovery, which is not readily available in the local market".⁵

Kasada's managing partner David Damiba was blunter in 2021, when the fund first borrowed from IFC. The partnership, he said, came "at a time when many commercial banks are retreating from the market".¹⁸

The sponsor and the asset

Kasada Capital Management describes itself as an independent real estate private equity platform dedicated to hospitality in Africa. It was set up in 2018 with the support of the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) and Accor.¹ Its fund, Kasada Hospitality Fund L.P., closed in April 2019 with more than $500m of equity commitments.¹ IFC names its two limited partners as QIA and Accor.⁵

The fund is registered in Mauritius.⁵ Its hotels are run under the Accor umbrella, so Accor is both an investor in the fund and the manager of its hotels.¹ MIGA records that under the hotel management agreements Accor controls each hotel's management and policies, on conditions agreed with Kasada.⁴

The fund had a plan agreed with the World Bank Group before it bought this hotel. Phase one was up to 20 hotels, about 4,000 keys, needing about $400m of debt and equity.^5,6 IFC's board approved up to $100m of IFC loans for the programme on 30 April 2021.⁵ In July 2021 Kasada announced up to $160m of debt from IFC, including money IFC would bring in from other lenders.^18,5

Each hotel bought is a sub-project. The first was eight Accor-managed hotels in West and Central Africa, bought on 31 December 2020. They were financed in 2021 by a €67.5m ($80m) senior loan from IFC, with Proparco as parallel lender.^18,19

The asset was owned by Golden Jubilee Limited, a Kenyan company that ran it as a Crowne Plaza under IHG.⁴ The Star reported that Nazir Ahmed Akbarali owned 97.5% of Golden Jubilee and Anish Akbarali 2.5%.^12,26 The hotel opened in 2010 with 206 rooms, a ballroom for 300 and more than ten meeting rooms.^9,4 An office annex followed in 2016, by MIGA's date.⁴ The hotel's revenue, occupancy and profit have not been published.

The financing

The capital came in three pieces over about ten months, from three kinds of institution. The framework behind them was two years older.

The purchase, July 2022. Falcon NBO, a Kasada subsidiary, bought all the issued shares of Golden Jubilee.^3,12 Kasada announced the deal on 28 July 2022 without a price.⁹ Business Daily reported an estimated KSh4.6bn, which Ecofin gave as $38.7m.^10,11 Sources cited by The Star put it at about KSh4.5bn, or about $37.9m on Ecofin's rate.¹² The Competition Authority of Kenya approved the purchase in August and disclosed no price.¹² Accor replaced IHG as manager.¹³

The insurance, December 2022. MIGA's board approved cover on 12 September 2022. On 5 December it issued two guarantees totalling $27.5m to Falcon NBO, for its equity and shareholder loan in Golden Jubilee.³ They insure against expropriation, restrictions on transferring money, and war and civil disturbance. Cover runs for up to 15 years on the equity and 5 years on the shareholder loan.³

The debt, June 2023. IFC lent $11m, and Proparco lent $11m in parallel.^1,2 Proparco signed on 5 June 2023 and records its loan as €10,075,105, which it calls a "USD 11m loan".² It describes the debt as a "senior loan arranged by IFC".² IFC said the money was to "refurbish, modernize, and expand the former Crowne Plaza".¹ Proparco says its loan "is financing the fund's first investment in Kenya, involving the acquisition of the hotel", and the renovation too.²

So the loans paid in part for a purchase that had closed ten months earlier. In a review dated as of May 2023, MIGA wrote that sub-projects other than the first were "currently relying on alternative financing", or had not finalised their agreements with IFC.⁷ What paid for the hotel in the meantime has not been disclosed.

Why the headline said $49.5m

Ecofin's headline in July 2023 was "Kasada raises $49.5 million to renovate the Crowne Plaza hotel".¹⁶ Africa Private Equity News reported the same package.¹⁵ The figure is the sum of three numbers: IFC's $11m loan, Proparco's $11m loan and MIGA's $27.5m of guarantees.^15,16

The guarantees are insurance on the fund's own investment. MIGA lent nothing to the hotel. As with any insurance, money would flow from MIGA only after a covered loss. The debt raised was $22m. The equity was the fund's, and its amount has not been published.

The package was reported on 20 and 22 July 2023.^15,16 The IFC press release now online is dated 20 December 2023, and differs from the version AVCA republished.^1,17 We do not know why.

The structure

Who owns the hotel, who lends to it and who insures it, as far as the record shows:

MIGA's $27.5m sits beside the debt. It insures the equity and the shareholder loan, which rank below it.³

The borrower is unclear. IFC names Kasada Hospitality Fund LP. Proparco lists its customer as "KASADA", headquartered in Kenya.^1,2 Whether the loans went to the fund, to Falcon NBO or to Golden Jubilee has not been published.

The terms can be read only from the programme. IFC said later sub-projects were "expected to align with Ayaba in terms of the proposed financial arrangements".⁵ Ayaba was the first, West African portfolio. Proparco described that loan as "a long-term senior loan, including a grace period taking into account the expected gradual recovery in the industry".¹⁹ Our inference is that the Nairobi loans are also long and began with a grace period. The Nairobi pages say nothing either way.

Across the programme, MIGA's guarantees run for up to 15 years. They cover up to 90% of equity or quasi-equity and up to 95% of shareholder loans.^4,7 The Kenya review put the programme ceiling at up to €264.7m, about $268m.⁴ MIGA's percentage of cover on the Nairobi equity is not stated.

The numbers

Price per room. The reported price of $38.7m over 206 rooms is about $188,000 a room.^11,9 The price is reported, not disclosed, so this is an estimate.

Debt against price. The $22m of senior debt is about 57% of the reported price. The debt also paid for the works, so its share of total cost is lower. The total cost is not public.

The insured investment. MIGA covers at most 95% of a shareholder loan and 90% of equity.⁴ If those caps applied here, $27.5m of cover implies at least about $29m of insured equity and shareholder loan. Add the $22m of debt and the money behind the hotel comes to at least about $51m. That is a third more than the reported price, which fits a refit funded from the same sources. This is our inference; no party has stated a total.

Rooms. The 206 rooms became a 162-room Pullman and a 44-room Mercure.^2,3 The total did not change.

Currency. Both loans are in dollars.^1,2 The shilling set repeated record lows in 2022, and a new low of 124.85/125.05 to the dollar on 6 February 2023.²³ How the hotel's revenue matches its dollar debt is not public.

Why it worked

The equity was already raised. Kasada did not have to find investors for one hotel. It had more than $500m committed by a sovereign wealth fund and a hotel group.¹

The operator was inside the deal. Accor is an investor in the fund and manages its hotels.^5,4 A lender to a hotel worries about who will run it. Here the brand that would run it had its own money in the owner.

The framework existed before the hotel did. IFC approved the programme in April 2021.⁵ IFC says MIGA issued a master contract covering Kasada's equity in 2021; Ecofin dates the MIGA agreement to January 2022.^1,16 Nairobi was the second sub-project under IFC's financing package.⁶ The template, the reviews and the relationships were in place.

The lenders had a reason of their own to lend. Proparco said that by financing the acquisition it was "affirming its countercyclical role of supporting the hotel industry which has been hard hit by the health crisis".² Both lenders count jobs kept, and this hotel had shed most of its staff.^2,6

Damiba later described what the insurance did for the equity. "MIGA provided Kasada with extensive guarantee coverage at competitive pricing across our target markets and geographies across key locations in Sub-Saharan African, which helped us to execute with increased certainty each of our investment transactions."⁸

What happened next

Accor announced the Pullman Hotel Nairobi Upper Hill in May 2024, with 162 rooms and a WOJO co-working space, to open in June.^20,21 It was billed as the first Pullman in East Africa. On 24 June ATTA reported it set to open at the end of the month.²²

In April 2025 the World Bank said the IFC and Proparco loans "have enabled the environmentally friendly modernization and expansion" of the former Crowne Plaza.⁸ It said MIGA's $225m of guarantees to Kasada "enabled $450 million in foreign direct investments" in the region's hospitality sector.⁸

By June 2025 Kasada had 19 hotels in seven sub-Saharan countries, and was planning a first deal in Morocco.²⁴ We found no default, restructuring, refinancing or sale of the Nairobi hotel.

What we do not know

• The loans' tenor, grace period, amortisation, rate, fees, security and covenants, and whether the two loans are identical.
• Which entity borrowed, and how the senior loans rank against Falcon NBO's shareholder loan.
• How much equity and shareholder loan Falcon NBO put in, the renovation budget and the total cost.
• What paid for the July 2022 purchase before the June 2023 debt. MIGA says "alternative financing" without naming it.⁷
• MIGA's premium, its percentage of cover on this investment, and whether the cover has been called.
• The advisers on the purchase and the financing. Business Daily quoted an unnamed "transaction advisor"; we could read only its headline.¹⁰
• Occupancy, room rates, revenue, earnings and debt service cover since reopening, and whether EDGE certification was achieved.

What a founder in an emerging market can take from it

Founders in Africa and other emerging markets ask us the same question. Who will fund us, on what terms, and where do development finance institutions fit? This case gives one set of answers, for one hotel. What follows is our read of what carries over.

Development finance came after the equity

IFC and Proparco did not buy the hotel. A fund with more than $500m committed did, and the lenders arrived ten months later.^1,2 Our read is that a development finance institution is rarely the first money in. It supplies the long loan that commercial banks will not, once a sponsor has taken the first risk.

They will look at everything, and publish it

IFC appraised the hotel on site on 6 to 8 June 2022, before the purchase was announced.^4,6 MIGA published an environmental and social action plan for the project in August 2022.¹⁴ Both rated it category B.^3,6 Proparco expects the building to reach EDGE green certification within two years.²

All of it is public. IFC disclosed its summary two months before its board approved the programme.⁵ MIGA disclosed its proposed guarantee a month before its board.³ A founder who cannot live with that degree of disclosure should look elsewhere.

Expect more than one lender

IFC's case for its own role included bringing in "debt funding from another lender".⁵ Here that lender was Proparco, lending the same amount in parallel.² Two institutions means two credit processes. The arranger brings the second, and the borrower answers both.

The currency risk stays with you

Both loans are in dollars, and the shilling fell to a record low four months before Proparco signed.^2,23 Nothing we read says how that risk was handled. One comparable shows a different answer. On Onomo Hotels in 2021, IFC put up to €15.2m (about $18.5m) of concessional subordinated debt under an A loan of up to €20.9m (about $25m).²⁵ IFC said the concessional layer "reduces the risk of the senior loans to a level that meets IFC risk/reward criteria".²⁵ We found no such layer in Nairobi.

A guarantee protects the equity, and lends nothing

MIGA's cover went to Falcon NBO, the equity holder.³ It made the fund's investment in Kenya safer against the state and against war. Our read is that this is what lets a sovereign wealth fund commit to one hotel in Nairobi. It is not money, and a founder who counts it as money will plan a raise $27.5m too large.

Plan for the time it takes

From IFC's first disclosure in February 2021 to Proparco's signature in June 2023 was 27 months.^5,2 From MIGA's disclosure to its guarantees was about four months.³ Kasada closed its purchase without the development finance in place. On its first portfolio, Société Générale provided bridge financing that the IFC and Proparco loan later replaced.¹⁸ Our view is that a founder should plan to close without the development bank, then refinance into it.

What the sponsor has to bring

Kasada brought committed equity, an operator with money in the deal, a programme agreed in advance and an asset of 206 rooms.^1,5,9 Each of those answered a question a lender would otherwise have asked. A founder without a sponsor like that should expect the development bank to ask who will stand behind the business if recovery is slow.

The development banks supplied the length of the loan. The sponsor supplied everything else.

Cite as: “A Nairobi hotel borrowed $22m from two development banks, ten months after it was bought”, Norvian Review, 24 September 2026.